SACF Comments: Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of ICASA in CYBERSECURITY Regulation - DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

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Submitted: 30 November 2018
SACF Comments: Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of
ICASA in CYBERSECURITY Regulation – DISCUSSION DOCUMENT
SACF Comments – Discussion Document Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of
ICASA in terms of Cybersecurity
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SACF COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AMENDMENT BILL
INTRODUCTION
1. The SACF is an industry association that represents a diverse group of members
that participate throughout the ICT value chain and are therefore in a unique
position, to bring considerable insights through the experience of our members
– small and large across the ICT value chain.
2. The SACF welcomes the opportunity to comment on the section 4B Inquiry into
in the Role of the Authority in respect of Cybersecurity.
3. Our submission is limited to three key themes, which we trust will contribute to
ICASA’s discussion in respect of its role on Cybersecurity.
4. The SACF would like to participate in oral hearings on the Cybersecurity
Discussion Document, should there be any.
ROLE OF ICASA IN CYBERSECURITY
5. It is laudable that ICASA, has initiated an inquiry into cybersecurity given its
growing importance as consumers are increasingly connected.
6. ICASA is a creature of statue and therefore derives its powers and mandate
from legislation.
7. Therefore, ICASA’s powers a confined to what has been prescribed in the
applicable legislative framework.
8. ICASA draws its mandate from the Electronic Communications Act (ECA),
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) Act and the
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) from which ICASA
draws its mandate.
SACF Comments – Discussion Document Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of
ICASA in terms of Cybersecurity
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9. On our reading none of the above legislation empowers ICASA to regulate
licensees in respect of Cybersecurity.
10. Instead, the Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill, provides for the role of
regulating Cybersecurity to the Cybersecurity Hub which falls within the
Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS).
11. As long as ICASA has no legislated powers in respect of Cybersecurity, we are
of the view, it cannot impose obligations or regulate on Cybersecurity.
12. However, that does not mean that ICASA has no role to play in respect of
Cybersecurity.
13. A key area of ICASA’s mandate is consumer protection, therefore, in our view
the absence of a legislative mandate does not preclude ICASA from running
regular consumer awareness campaigns on topics related to Cybersecurity.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER REGULATORS
14. We note ICASA’s questions in respect of the implementation of POPI.
15. The Information Regulator has primary jurisdiction over the POPI Act.
16. The Cybersecurity Hub through the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill has
primary jurisdiction in terms of Cybersecurity.
17. However, we are of the view that while, the Authority does not have primary
jurisdiction in respect of Cybersecurity or in respect of POPI.
18. We are of the view that these relationships should be no different than that
between ICASA and the Competition Commission. Accordingly, we would
encourage ICASA to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
the Information Regulator and the Cyber Hub.
SACF Comments – Discussion Document Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of
ICASA in terms of Cybersecurity
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POLICY-MAKING ROLE
19. In the Discussion Document, ICASA poses a question as to whether it has a role
in respect of policy making in respect of Cybersecurity.
20. Until the early nineties, the Minister or political head was responsible for setting
policy, making regulations and being the operator of the state monopoly – a
practice that was noted globally. Prices were not necessarily lower, service was
less than ideal, and services were not ubiquitous. During the 90s because of
global best practice most countries including South Africa embarked on
processes which culminated in the separation of powers. The political head
was responsible for policy, independent regulators were created, and the
incumbent monopolist became an independent operator. Competition was
introduced. Although, in South Africa, the State continues to hold a stake in
more than one licensee and the Ministry of Telecommunications and Postal
Services is the shareholder representative in Telkom and Broadband Infraco as
examples.
21. The purpose of the separation of powers was that the political heads would
determine policy which is underpinned or aligned to a specific political
agenda. The need for an independent regulator with the ability to
independently consider and accept or reject policy directions, is to maintain
fairness. However, this is not absolute as regulation does not operate outside of
overall national policy and legislative framework. Once the overarching policy
has been set, the execution of regulations and licensing ought to be done
independently and objectively.
22. It is important to note that the regulator’s powers are confined to that which is
bestowed upon it in law.
SACF Comments – Discussion Document Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of
ICASA in terms of Cybersecurity
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23. The responsibility and role of policy making lies with the relevant line Ministry.
Therefore, we are of the view that ICASA has no legislative powers or mandate
to make policy, including policy on Cybersecurity.
CAPACITY BUILDING
24. We laud ICASA for recognizing the growing importance of Cybersecurity and
as a key growth area for the future of work and its intent to play a role in
developing critical skills.
25. Despite, ICASA’s noble intention to participate in capacity building towards
developing cybersecurity skills, we are of the view that ICASA may not be best
placed to participate in Cybersecurity capacity building.
26. As we understand it, ICASA is already resource constrained, financially and
from a human resource perspective, as gleaned from ICASA’s various
submissions advocating for a self-funded model to alleviate its resource
constraints.
27. We further understand that ICASA’s budgetary allocation was reduced during
the current financial year.
CONCLUSION
28. We would again like to thank ICASA for the opportunity to submit comments.
29. We would like to reiterate our views that ICASA does not have primary
jurisdiction over cybersecurity and the protection of personal information.
However, it does have a secondary role to play and more directly to
cybersecurity in its ongoing awareness campaigns.

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